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Abstract
On December 1, 1934, Sergei Mironovich Kirov, head of the Leningrad party organization of the Soviet
Union, was shot dead outside his office in the former Smolny Institute. Kirov’s murder would prove to be the
catalyst that effectively launched General Secretary Joseph Stalin’s Great Purge of the Communist Party from
1936 to 1938. In this two year period hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens were executed and millions
more were sentenced to exile. Though an earthshaking start to an inexplicably dark period of Soviet history,
the real intrigue in Kirov’s assassination lies in the fact that, over 75 years later, the case remains inconclusive.
This paper attempts to shed light on the various theories surrounding the possible culprits involved in the
Kirov assassination as well as address the potential limitations involved in ultimately achieving the notion of
historical truth.
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 At 11:00 p.m., December 1, 1934, unsuspecting Soviet citizens were gathered around 
their radios, unknowingly about to witness a historical event that would forever change the 
USSR as they knew it. An announcement interrupted a regular news program with word that 
Politburo member and Leningrad First Secretary Sergei Mironovich Kirov was dead. All further 
broadcasting ceased for the evening.
1
 Earlier that day at 4:30 p.m., Kirov was shot outside his 
office in the former Smolny Institute by ex-party member Leonid Vasilievich Nikolaev.
2
 
Immediately after the shot was fired, Nikolaev dropped to the ground and was arrested by 
authorities. A laborious attempt to revive the 46-year-old Kirov was unsuccessful.
3
 The trusted 
advisor of Stalin was dead, and his assassin was being held in custody awaiting trial. Case 
closed. 
 If only it were that simple. There was Nikolaev, lying on the ground, holding the gun that 
shot the bullet that struck Kirov. What question could there be of the culprit? Anyone standing in 
the corridor of the former Smolny Institute that winter afternoon could say from personal 
experience that Nikolaev was the man responsible for murdering one of the nation‟s favored 
political personalities. The question, then, lies not in who committed the act, but why, and with 
what support? The Kirov assassination is the event that historical scholars point to as the impetus 
of the Great Purge, a period of two years that would result in the execution of 700,000 Soviet 
citizens and the exile of millions more.
4
 Though the exact details and motivations behind the 
event remain inconclusive, the onset of Stalin‟s paranoid expulsions, and executions, of 
unfaithful party members can reasonably be traced back to that one shot heard throughout the 
corridors of the Smolny Institute in December of 1934. 
 As history shows, Nikolaev would eventually pay for his crimes against the state on 
December 29, but not before hundreds of other individuals would be charged for complicity in 
the crime. In the eyes of General Secretary Joseph Stalin, neither Nikolaev‟s execution alone nor 
the execution of 116 others could sufficiently atone for this egregious crime against the state. 
Many more were in line to pay for Nikolaev‟s crime and for any other unrequited crimes, past 
and future, which could be connected to the Smolny incident. 
 On December 2, the day following the attack in the corridor, Nikolaev was publicly 
exposed as the assassin and Izvestia, the journalistic mouthpiece of the government, was in the 
process of flooding the press with reports of a connection between the assault on Kirov and a 
greater “White Guard” conspiracy.5 Harold Denny, correspondent for the New York Times, 
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reported that “[w]hether Nikolaev had accomplices, whether his action was political or inspired 
simply by a personal grievance, real or fancied, was still undisclosed,” but Izvestia editor-in-
chief Nikolay Bukharin seemed to have already determined who was to be held responsible.
6
 
Without including details as to exactly where and when the assassination of Kirov occurred, the 
press was positioning the public to take immediate action against any group or affiliate that 
would be willing to carry out a blatant attack on the Soviet state. After all, the connection 
between Nikolaev and the White Guard was seemingly intended to provoke certain feelings of 
hatred for the imperial past from those openly committed to the Socialist ideal. 
  On December 3, the official details of the assassination were finally released to the 
public. The record shows that Kirov was shot down outside his office in the former Smolny 
Institute. Kirov was without his body guard, Borisov, at the moment of the shooting.
 7
 According 
to the report released by the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Kirov was about to enter his office 
when Nikolaev, who had been “lying in wait for him in a corridor, ... fired one bullet into the 
back of his neck, fracturing his skull. The wound was almost instantly fatal. ... Nikolaev was 
arrested on the spot ....”8 
 Later that evening and continuing into the early morning of December 4, Kirov‟s body 
made its way from the Uritsky Palace in Leningrad to its final resting place in Moscow, escorted 
by leading Soviet officials, including Stalin, Commissar of Defense Klementi Voroshiloff, and 
Chairman of the Council of People‟s Commissars, V. M. Molotov.9 By the time the procession 
reached Moscow, 71 people had been arrested: 32 in the Moscow region and 39 in the region of 
Leningrad, including the head of the Leningrad NKVD, Filip Medved. All seventy-one were 
labeled as White Guards and charged as “plotters of terroristic attacks against Soviet 
officials.”10 This was the first attempt to take action against those responsible for the crime, other 
than Nikolaev who was still being held in custody. All would be sentenced according to the 
Politburo resolution passed that day stipulating that: 
 
     The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees: 
     To introduce the following changes in the existing criminal-procedural codes of the 
Union Republics dealing with the investigation and trial of cases of terrorist 
organizations and terrorist acts against workers of the Soviet power: 
1. Investigation of such cases to be completed in a period not exceeding 10 days. 
2. The indictment to be handed down to the accused one day before trial. 
3. Cases to be heard without participation of prosecution and defense. 
4. To allow no appeal against sentence or for pardon. 
5. Death sentence to be carried out as soon as it is pronounced.
11
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  Of the 71 people arrested, 66 were shot dead before Kirov‟s body was cremated on the 
fifth of December.
12
 Numerous mass arrests and subsequent executions, such as those of the 
original 71, would follow long after Kirov was buried and his assassin was executed. Therefore, 
by using the assassination as the fulcrum of his rationalization for a cleansing of the party, Stalin 
was able to move smoothly from initially placing blame on remnants of the czarist regime to 
later accusing ex-party members, and so-called “Left Deviators,” of direct responsibility for 
Nikolaev‟s actions.13 Former Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern Grigory 
Zinoviev, his close ally Lev Kamenev, and former commander of the Red Army Leon Trotsky, 
were among those targeted.
14
 
 Zinoviev and Kamenev‟s alleged involvement in the Kirov assassination simply added to 
their turbulent history of membership in the Communist party. Once conspirators of Vladimir 
Lenin while he was in exile, Zinoviev and Kamenev also served as members of Stalin‟s 
governing troika (triumvirate) in 1923-1925.
15
 During that time, the party turned against Trotsky 
and his Left Opposition, an act which eventually resulted in Trotsky‟s banishment from the 
Soviet Union in 1927. Zinoviev and Kamenev‟s expulsion from the party occurred in the same 
year, after a brief period in which the two men were united with Trotsky against Stalin‟s position 
on the possibility of establishing socialism successfully in one nation.
16
 Unlike Trotsky, 
however, Zinoviev and Kamenev were later reinstated as party members after capitulating to the 
authorities.
17
 The official announcement of the arrest of Zinoviev and Kamenev was released by 
the press on December 23, although rumors of their arrests had surfaced four days earlier.
18
 
  Zinoviev and Kamenev, as well as the seventeen others arrested with them, faced trial on 
January 15. On January 17, Zinoviev and Kamenev were found by the court to be “morally 
responsible” for Nikolaev‟s attack on Kirov, and were subsequently sentenced to varying degrees 
of imprisonment.
19
 Neither Zinoviev, nor Kamenev, was allowed to finish his original sentence, 
however, before they were each brought to trial for a second time in August of 1936. At this 
point, the authorities had deduced that Zinoviev and Kamenev were heading a group known as 
the “Moscow Centre.”20 The members of this group were alleged to have been aware of the plan 
to assassinate Kirov, carried out by Nikolaev and the “Leningrad Center,” and were in turn 
sentenced to death on August 24 for not only their participation in the death of Kirov, but for 
their involvement in a greater conspiracy to eliminate other Soviet leaders, including the General 
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Secretary himself. The trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev and the fourteen others would come to be 
known as the “Trial of the Sixteen,” the first of Stalin‟s infamous Moscow Trials.  
 The political shock wave that radiated from Kirov‟s assassination reached far into the 
1950s and beyond. The events of 1934 led directly into the show trials of 1936 and subsequently 
into the massive purge of the Communist party that encompassed the years 1936-1938. Though 
all of the individuals initially charged with direct involvement in the assassination were executed 
by the end of 1936, the discourse concerning the details of Nikolaev‟s crime was revisited by 
“several secret commissions” between 1956 and 1967. Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premiere 
from 1958 to 1964, also referred to the assassination in his Secret Speech, delivered February 
1956 at the Twentieth Party Congress, and addressed the issue as a point of contention again at 
the Twenty-second Party Conference in 1961.
21
 
 In the early years of the Cold War, various Soviet refugees were interviewed by 
representatives from the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System (HPSSS). Though the 
assassination of Kirov does not seem to be a topic that was of specific interest to the 
interviewers, the refugees who did provide accounts of the incident provided a number of 
divergent explanations for Kirov‟s death which more or less fail to clarify the already convoluted 
chain of events. Many of the individuals interviewed acknowledged the official version of the 
facts concerning the direct involvement of the Zinovievite-Trotskyist bloc, but remained reticent 
as to their own personal opinions of the situation. In sharp contrast to what the press had 
reported, in the refugee accounts, Stalin was often accused of being directly responsible for the 
murder. Kirov was seen merely as an excuse to launch the purge of the party that Stalin had long 
wanted to set in motion. With that in mind, what better first victim than a man who was 
suspected of maintaining allegiances to the Leninist era and whose growing popularity with the 
public, and various government agencies, was threatening to undermine Stalin as ruler of the 
party? One account, given by a “literary critic and newspaper correspondent,” described a period 
in which Kirov and Stalin were in disagreement over the extension of slave labor and forced 
agricultural production in the Soviet Union.
22
 This discrepancy temporarily brought Kirov closer 
to Bukharin and the right opposition: “an alliance ... most dangerous ... for Stalin.”23 Though 
Kirov was one of Stalin‟s men, the interviewee specified that, “...in the party which Stalin was 
building an oppositionist [was] an enemy.”24 
 Still, there were others who refused to believe that the assassination was an assassination 
at all. One interviewee maintained that there was absolutely no political motive involved in the 
murder. Though the Soviet press does not appear to have presented an explanation of the crime 
that involved Nikolaev acting solely on personal motive, this individual assured his interviewer 
that “[t]here was no political implication in the death of Kirov.”25 The man went on to say that he 
(Kirov) was “killed by the husband of an actress with whom Kirov was having an affair.”26 This 
is not the only mention of Nikolaev having acted independently. More than one interview 
perpetuates the notion that Kirov was merely eliminated by a jealous husband. The issue of 
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whether the woman Kirov was supposedly sleeping with was an actress or his secretary differs 
slightly between accounts, but the principle is the same.  
 However, why would a rumor surface, and become widely accepted by the public, that 
Kirov was having an affair with Nikolaev‟s wife if a theory of this nature was never mentioned 
in the official presses? If this was truly the reasoning behind the attack, why would the 
government have gone to the trouble to fabricate another politically charged explanation? It is 
possible that the government would have done so if Stalin needed an excuse to begin his purge, 
but how then would these believers in the affair between Kirov and Nikolaev‟s wife explain the 
events following the crime? That is, how could they explain the hundreds of people arrested and 
executed for complicity in the crime before Nikolaev himself was executed? Would the 
responsibility of these arrests not then be directly attributed to Stalin without a justified reason 
such as the need to restore, and maintain, national security? Upon closer inspection, this 
perspective on the assassination thus does not seem satisfactory.  
 Scholars including British historian Robert Conquest and biographer of Kirov, Amy 
Knight argue that there is little doubt that Stalin was the orchestrator of the entire Kirov 
assassination. According to their research Nikolaev was merely a puppet in the General 
Secretary‟s larger scheme of instigating a purge of the party that would in turn expel all proven, 
and potential, enemies from the inner circles of the Soviet state. Stalin, therefore, can be said to 
have used the death of one man to effectively imprison, exile, and/or execute millions of people 
throughout the Soviet Union and abroad. Despite how outlandish this last statement may sound, 
it is fundamentally true, whether Stalin explicitly planned the assassination or not. 
 No matter who was responsible for the initial attack on Kirov, it is fair to say that Stalin 
can be blamed for what was to follow, though even in this he did not act alone.
27
 One must 
remember it was still necessary for Stalin to work within the standards that had been established 
by government policy following the Bolshevik revolution. Stalin was, to a certain extent, 
confined by a political structure that had prevailed for the last seventeen years. Even with the 
resolution passed on December 4, 1934, that granted Stalin permission to act as he saw fit and 
absolved him of the need to seek the approval of the Politburo,
28
 there were still specific methods 
and courses of action which the Soviet government was expected to employ.  
 The difficulty in attempting to address the subject of the Kirov murder is that ultimately 
Nikolaev‟s attack on the Leningrad committee leader was not an isolated incident. This one act, 
whether political or personal, began long before December 1, and the ramifications of it reach far 
past the days of the Soviet bloc. Presently a decade into the twenty-first century, no one is able to 
definitively explain who, or what, was behind the killing. Owing to brief periods of relaxation in 
the Soviet and post-Soviet past, more documentation of the episode has been made public. 
However, even portions of the information that were released in the 1980s under General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev‟s glasnost and perestroika policies have already been shuffled 
away into the party archives, possibly never again to see the light of day. Under these conditions, 
it is difficult to find the truth. Arguably no one directly involved in the crime itself may have 
ever had all of the facts. If Stalin was the mastermind behind the whole ordeal, he could not have 
been certain that the assassination of one Politburo member would be enough to initiate a purge 
of the entire party. What if Nikolaev failed to follow through with the plan? What if Kirov 
suspected an attack?     
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 Historians could speculate on the events of December 1934 for the next fifty years and 
likely still fall far short of the truth. Surely new details would surface, never before seen 
documents would shed new light on the role of Nikolaev‟s bodyguard or on Trotsky‟s interaction 
with the “Moscow Centre,” but to what avail? Soviet NKVD defector Walter Krivitsky, who in 
1939 made an explicit claim in the Saturday Evening Post concerning Stalin‟s direct 
responsibility for the hit on Kirov, remarked that “[b]esides Stalin, there are probably no more 
than three or four people alive who could solve the Kirov mystery.”29 If these three or four 
people who, in 1939, could have probably cracked the case, are unnamed and are most certainly 
unavailable for comment, what hope is there to ever discover exactly what occurred that 
December day over seventy-five years ago? Nevertheless, despite the ambiguity that surrounds 
many of the details, it does appear certain that Stalin used the murder as a way to launch the 
infamous purges of the late 1930s.  
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